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Abstract
In this paper, we review changes in the insurance industry due to new risk-based regulations such as
Solvency 2 and Swiss Solvency Test. The move from corporate management based on cash-ﬂow to
risk-based management is described and discussed through its consequences on capital management,
economic valuation and the internal model. We discuss the limits and difﬁculties of enterprise risk
management and its effect on the organisation of companies and the role of actuaries in insurance.
The risk/return relation is becoming a central element of the company’s management slowly sup-
planting the traditional accounting view.
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1. Introduction
After the era of liberalisation of the capital markets and of the insurance industry in the late 80’s,
European insurance companies are today implementing the new Solvency 2 prudential rules, while
Swiss insurers have been applying the Swiss Solvency Test (SST) for several years now. Both regulations
are intended to be risk-based and to address the deﬁciencies stemming from the market liberalisation.
However, discussions on the subject mainly concern the pertinence of the different measures proposed
or the cost of upgrading the companies to ﬁt Solvency II requirements. Contrary to the heated debates
during the elaboration of risk-based solvency regulations, scant attention is paid today to the profound
changes represented by these regulations in terms of corporate management.
In this paper, we want to highlight some of the developments experienced by the insurance industry,
pointing to some difﬁculties and evolutions in the enterprise culture and organisation. It is done from
the point of view of a practitioner who lived through many of these changes and who has also tried
to theorise this evolution to best accompany them for preparing the insurance of tomorrow. Here, we
shall explore some of the key features in this development and propose ways of improving it, based
simultaneously on the experience of a large international reinsurer and on our understanding of the
challenges ahead of the insurance industry. The points made here apply to both insurance and
reinsurance companies as risk management does not essentially differ in both organisations. Bankers
were the ﬁrst to think about the role of capital for controlling risk (see, for instance, the seminal book
of Matten, 2000; Bernstein, 2007). There is a vast literature on risk management both in banks
(Crouhy et al., 2001) and insurance companies (Shimpi et al., 1999) or for a more modern version of
quantitative risk management (Embrechts et al., 2015). However, there is no book or review paper
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that describes the fundamental changes the industry is going through and discusses its consequences
on companies’ organisation and culture, particularly the role of actuaries. Here we want to make
the reader, actuaries, insurance economists, risk managers aware of the transformations and the
questions facing the insurance of the future.
The insurance industry has a long history and its contribution to the expansion of the European
economies in the 19th and 20th century is signiﬁcant (see, for instance, James et al., 2013).
Today, it is still an essential component of a healthy development of the economy. For many
years, corporate management was limited to the management of cash-ﬂow. As long as the
premiums received and the ﬁnancial returns exceeded the payment of claims and overheads, the
company was considered to be proﬁtable and thus solvent. The performance indicators derived
from this approach were, and still are, the combined ratio (claims plus costs in the numerator,
divided by the premiums in the denominator) in P&C insurance and the technical margin
(the ratio of gross revenue to premiums and ﬁnancial returns – to claims paid) in life insurance.
Even today, these performance measures are paramount in corporate communication and media
coverage.
However, ﬁnancial market pressure, banking regulations and the new risk-based insurance
regulations, are leading to the gradual introduction of other performance measures such as return on
Risk-Adjusted Capital (RAC) and return on equity (ROE), all of which are related to the concept
of the risk underwritten by insurers. This means not only knowing the positive cash-ﬂow position,
but also whether the return obtained on a given contract is commensurate with the risks incurred.
The notion of capital thus becomes a central issue. This capital must be correctly evaluated
and allocated to the underwritten business. This implies profound changes in both the mindset
and organisation to meet these requirements. Life insurance companies were the ﬁrst to introduce
statistical methods to calculate their premiums based on mortality tables, which were already
popular at the end of the 19th century. The actuarial calculation of premiums and insurance
reserves became widespread and has continued to develop up until the present time. However,
actuaries were usually conﬁned to very narrow areas and did not participate directly in corporate
management. They were asked to evaluate the reserve requirements and calculate premiums but were
never asked for advice on the type of business to be developed or the return on the underwritten
business.
The introduction of risk management at the executive level of insurance companies has completely
changed the perspective and role of actuaries who are traditionally responsible for quantitatively
evaluating the risks. Company managers must now pay attention to both the new performance indi-
cators and manage the company’s capital. Market pressure is reinforced by regulatory requirements to
encourage companies to rethink their operating methods and business model.
In the following section, we will start by discussing the concept of capital, its deﬁnition, pointing out
the distinction between available capital and RAC. We also examine its different usage and its
management. In the third section, we discuss economic valuation and look at the controversy it has
generated. In the current interpretation of the new paradigm, it is at the heart of the computation of
RAC. In section 4, we describe the internal model used to generate the RAC and some ways it can be
validated. In section 5, we present enterprise risk management (ERM), which is the way the modern
organisation copes with the management of capital and more generally of risks. In the last section,
we conclude by summarising the features marking the evolution of the insurance industry, to ﬁnish in
opening up to its future.
Michel Dacorogna
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2. Risk Capital and its Management
Central to this change of paradigm is the concept of risk capital, the management of which is
becoming a key issue for an insurer’s management activities. In discussing the concept, we will also
highlight two problems related to its deﬁnition and computation: the economic valuation of liabilities
and the mathematical deﬁnition of RAC based on probability distributions.
In the early 1990s, the notion of risk capital became prevalent in banks under the inﬂuence of the
Basel Committee and the introduction of risk regulations. The notion was extended to insurance
companies and other ﬁnancial institutions shortly afterward, at the beginning of the last decade.
Today, capital management is high on the agenda of corporate management bodies. Capital is seen
as a guarantee to customers that the ﬁnancial institution will meet its obligations up to a certain level
of probability (generally 99% for banks and 99.5% for insurance companies). It is therefore not
ancillary but represents the “commodity”, as it were, used by companies to generate business and
proﬁts. As a result, risk capital must be managed so as to optimise the company’s performance. This
means that its allocation cannot be treated as a peripheral issue; on the contrary, it must be at the
very core of insurance business management, like that of banks (for further discussion in this respect,
see, for example, Matten, 2000; Bernstein, 2007).
2.1. Risk capital and solvency ratio
Capital is used by insurance companies as a guarantee that they will pay the policyholder beyond the
average claim for this type of policy but only up to a certain pre-determined limit which has a very low
probability. The question that naturally follows is how much capital the company needs to cover the
risks in its portfolio and within what timeframe? At this stage of our reasoning, it is useful to deﬁne two
types of capital that will play an important role not only in determining the company’s solvency but also
in managing its performance objectives. First, there is the available capital, Ce, which is sometimes called
the economic capital (EC) on the company’s balance sheet, and second, there is the minimum capital
required by the company to cover the risks in its portfolio, called the “Risk-Adjusted Capital” (RAC),
Cr. This capital corresponds to the amount determined by an actuarial estimation of the combined risk
of the insurer’s assets and liabilities. The company’s solvency ratio, S, is then deﬁned as:
S :=
Ce
Cr
> 1 (1)
For a company to be solvent, this ratio must obviously be >1, but mathematically, it can, of course,
be <1. The time horizon generally chosen is 1 year. This applies to both Solvency 2 and the SST.
Here, we are going to discuss both the numerator and the denominator of S. This ratio is of
paramount importance in determining an insurance company’s solvency. Since under Solvency 2,
companies are required to disclose this ratio, it is becoming an important measure for bank analysts
and a marketing tool for companies.
2.2. Available/EC and RAC
To deﬁne the various forms of capital, let us consider a ﬁnancial institution whose value can be
expressed in terms of the economic value of its assets, A and of its liabilities, L. The time evolution of
these two variables is expressed in terms of two stochastic processes:
A= A tð Þ; t≥ 0ð Þ and L= L tð Þ; t≥0ð Þ
A change of paradigm for the insurance industry
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deﬁned on a probability space: (Ω; A; IP). The value of the institution at any point in time t is then
described by the stochastic process V= (V(t), t≥0) deﬁned by:
V tð Þ=A tð ÞL tð Þ
In the new solvency rules, the economic or available capital, Ce is deﬁned as the company’s current
economic value, based on the assumption that it will not underwrite any more business the following
year. That is, at an instant t:
Ce tð Þ=Ve a tð Þð ÞVe l tð Þð Þ (2)
where Ve is the function giving the economic value of a variable. The EC is then the value of this
process at a point in time t, that is why we write the asset and the liabilities with small letters as they
are realisations of the processes A and L. This value differs from the economic value calculated by an
investor when buying a company. To the value deﬁned in equation (2), the investor would add an
economic valuation of any future business the company is likely to underwrite and the resulting
proﬁts of it. As a result, Ve, does not strictly represent the economic value of the company. It is
simply the conversion of an ordinary balance sheet into an economic balance sheet. Ve enables the
computation of Ce from the different components of the balance sheet without any other con-
sideration of the company’s future business than the interest rates to discount the cash-ﬂows. We will
not go any further into Ve, which deserves a paper of its own. Some of the problems related to the
economic valuation of liabilities are discussed in section 3.
We now consider the deﬁnition of the denominator of equation (1), noting that the deﬁnition of
Ce should be compared with that of Cr. We shall see in section 2.3 that the available capital, Ce, must
be adjusted when Cr is deﬁned as it traditionally is in the theory of risk, that is, as the variation with
respect to the mathematical expectation:
Cr = IE X½ ρ Xð Þ (3)
where X represents the random variable of the change in the company’s economic value at time
horizon Δt. This is usually the sum of the random variables of all the risks of the assets, nA, and
liabilities, nL valued economically, deﬁned as
X tð Þ=
XnA
i=1
Ai t +Δtð ÞAi tð Þð Þ +
XnL
j=1
Lj t +Δtð ÞLj tð Þ
 
(4)
and ρ is the chosen risk measure, generally the Value-at-Risk (VaR) or the mathematical expectation
of the losses over a certain threshold (TVaR). We have omitted here for convenience the function Ve,
which should be read implicitly. It should be noted that X(t) is nothing else than the change in Ce at
time horizon Δt
X tð Þ=Ce t +Δtð ÞCe tð Þ
It can therefore be seen that Cr and Ce are indirectly related and that the deﬁnition of one affects the
deﬁnition of the other.
We notice here that the solvency regulation deﬁnition of Cr differs from equation (3). It is simply deﬁned as
CSr :=ρ Xð Þ (5)
Michel Dacorogna
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The argument being that this is the policyholder’s point of view: when basically the capital is called
on when P&L becomes negative. The deﬁnition given in equation (3) for Cr could be seen as the
RAC from the shareholder’s point of view, which is ironically of course more onerous. In the next
sub-section, we discuss this issue and point out the dangers of the regulatory deﬁnition.
2.3. Consistency between RAC and EC
If Cr is deﬁned by equation (3), then equation (2) will not be sufﬁcient to deﬁne Ce, that is, to convert
the ordinary balance sheet into an economic balance sheet in order to obtain the EC. To do this, the
mathematical expectation of the proﬁts for the time horizon considered must be added to the value
considered:
Ce =Ve Að ÞVe Lð Þ + IE X½  (6)
Not doing so would be like refusing the gift of a lottery ticket whose proﬁts, even if they are low, are
represented by IE[X]. In this case, equation (3) becomes: Cr=IE[X] while Ce=0 (no pre-existing
capital, only a lottery ticket), which would mean a solvency ratio of nil. On the other hand, if we
accept that the EC Ce contains future proﬁts, that is, that Ce follows equation (6), the offer of a
lottery ticket would be acceptable because the RAC would be offset by the equivalent available
capital and the solvency ratio would therefore be equal to 1 (we summarise in Table 1 the various
deﬁnition and solvency ratio). This example shows the importance of having coherent deﬁnitions
when calculating a solvency ratio.
In the case of Solvency 2, it could be thought that the problem is solved because the capital,
Cr, is deﬁned directly as minus the VaR at 99.5% of X(t), and not according to equation (3).
However, removing this expectation does not solve the problem at all. In this case, it becomes
possible to reduce artiﬁcially the capital requirements simply by being over-optimistic about
future income and therefore increasing IE[X], since the computation of the risk capital is for the
next year. By a simple translation effect, the VaR, and therefore the Cr, will be reduced by an
equivalent amount. Being over-optimistic about future proﬁts has consequences. It means that
Cr can be reduced by paradoxically increasing the company’s risk level because the proﬁt expecta-
tions are unrealistic. Being over-optimistic about the proﬁt expectation, undoubtedly increases the
risks. From a healthy risk management viewpoint, this simpliﬁed deﬁnition of Cr does not seem
relevant. This paradox, however, has not been noticed by the European supervisory authorities.
Although the SST’s deﬁnition of Cr uses another risk measure (TVaR) with another conﬁdence
interval (99%), the same problem exists because it does not take the mathematical expectation of the
proﬁts into account.
It therefore seems that it would be better in terms of incentive to change the deﬁnition of EC
according to equation (6) and keep the deﬁnition of equation (3) for the RAC.
Table 1. Schematic vision of the example of the gift of a lottery ticket.
Using equations (2)
and (3)
Using equations (6)
and (3)
Using equations (2)
and (5)
Economic capital 0 IE[X] 0
Risk capital IE[X] IE[X] 0
Solvency ratio 0 1 Undeﬁned
A change of paradigm for the insurance industry
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2.4. Problems with the current solvency definitions of capital and the need of
buffer capital
We will not dwell any further on how to calculate the EC based on the ordinary balance sheet.
The Solvency 2 rules are very precise in this respect (European Commission, 2015: 49–57). We will
simply indicate certain issues that have not been resolved and which open the way to various inter-
pretations that are presently under heated discussion. One of these is the choosing of which interest rate
should be used to discount liabilities (Dacorogna, 2012). At present, whether we are talking about the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) or the Swiss Financial Monetary
Authority (Finma), the supervisory authorities publish their own yield curves to be used by insurers to
discount liabilities instead of choosing those deduced from the latest ﬁnancial market values according to
the “mark-to-market” principles. Another question is whether the available capital is really “available”
under stress conditions. In other words, the liquidity of the means available to a company under stress is
a subject of concern, leading regulators to classify bank capital from most liquid (ﬁrst tier) to least liquid
(third tier) with requirements concerning the proportion of capital covered by each of these classes. The
treatment of dividends and deferred tax assets also cause controversy that we will not develop here.
The lack of precision in deﬁning the EC also applies to Cr. We saw earlier that the supervisory
authorities did not choose a strict deﬁnition from a risk theory viewpoint; risk measure also differs from
one system to the other (for a comparison of Solvency 2 and SST, see Dacorogna & Keller, 2010). Apart
from the strict deﬁnition of Ce in equation (2), the RAC, Cr, also depends on two other choices: that of
the risk measure (VaR, TVaR) and that of the interval at which it is measured (99.5%, 99%). It would
be much better if practices could be harmonised and the industry come to a universally recognised
deﬁnition. Unfortunately, we do not seem to be heading in that direction on an international level given
the present discussions between the American and European authorities on the subject.
Each company must nevertheless decide for itself how to optimally deploy its capital based on its own
strategy and the method it has chosen to allocate its capital to different risks. To do so, insurers must
adapt their practices while satisfying the requirements of the shareholders, the supervisory authorities, the
rating agencies and the speciﬁc conditions relating to their business. The triangle of constraints con-
stituted by proﬁtability, solvency and market penetration becomes the space to be optimised. These three
constraints are interrelated of course and one cannot be determined without considering the other two.
Whence the question: how much capital is needed to satisfy these different requirements? The art of
capital management is to determine the amount required to give shareholders adequate remuneration
while ensuring the company’s stability and ﬁnancial credibility, while ensuring sufﬁcient market pene-
tration. For this reason, the current tendency of insurers is to communicate publicly on both a ROE
target and an interval for the solvency ratio deﬁned in equation (1). These two objectives go hand in hand
and cannot be deﬁned independently of each other. The equation derived in Besson et al. (2008) gives us
a simple expression that relates the target return, T, chosen by the company to its solvency ratio, S:
T =
μ
S
(7)
where μ is the risk premium allocated to the industry by the market at a solvency ratio of 1. An
illustration of this equation is given in Figure 1 where we have chosen a μ of 1,700 basis points above the
risk-free rate. This high value is due to the fact that the market does not expect insurance companies to
operate at this level of solvency but at a much higher level1. Finally, the insurance company’s
1 We prefer to qualify 17% as a high ﬁgure even though certain bank managers announce proﬁt targets of
25% without blinking an eyelid.
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management must decide on the amount of capital needed for its strategy according to the variables T,
μ and S, as explained in Besson et al. (2009).
The management’s task will therefore be to manage the capital so as to best satisfy the various
insurance stakeholders, all of whom have contradictory viewpoints. They are rapidly described
below:
1. The shareholders for whom the capital represents the value of their investment and would like to
keep it as low as possible in order to obtain the highest possible return.
2. The policyholders and the supervisory authorities want to obtain the highest possible insurance
capital because it guarantees payment of the liabilities contracted with the company.
3. The rating agencies who conduct an assessment of the ﬁnancial health of insurance companies to
ensure that their credit risk is sound. They expect the company to have sufﬁcient capital to
deserve its rating but they also check on its proﬁtability.
4. The management and staff who use the capital to generate the company’s proﬁts and also must
satisfy the requirements of all the other insurance stakeholders.
Constant balancing is the daily lot of modern companies seeking to adapt to new market conditions
and beneﬁt from the new rules governing the insurance sector, while developing their business over
the long term.
3. Economic Valuation of Liabilities
The basis for evaluating the capital and risks of the insurance industry is the economic valuation
of the company’s assets and liabilities. We have just seen that the available capital is deﬁned
in the Solvency 2 rules as the difference between the economic value of the assets and liabilities,
equation (2). The question of economic valuation has been at the centre of many controversies
and debates among insurance practitioners and academics for many years (see Babbel & Merrill,
1998, and the discussion afterwards). It has been introduced to provide insurance companies
with a method that would appeal to investors and to bring transparency and market consistent
valuation, for insurance, liabilities as well as for assets. The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008/2009 and the
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Figure 1. Illustration of the relationship between the company target return on equity (ROE)
(above the risk-free rate in basis point 0.01%) and its solvency target.
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drop in interest rates has brought many criticisms to economic valuation. In this section, we will
review some of these problems. However, despite these problems, economic valuation remains
fundamental for a realistic modelling of the risks of insurance companies and provides a good basis
for comparison between assets and liabilities. We believe it is here to stay even though progress for
the economic valuation of long-term liabilities is certainly needed.
3.1. The law of one price and the replicating portfolio
The economic valuation of assets is fairly simple provided they are being valued in sufﬁciently liquid
markets. In this case, determining the economic value means ﬁnding the market price of the assets
concerned. In accounting jargon, this is known as “mark-to-market”. However, the situation
becomes complicated when assets have to be valued in markets with low and even non-existent
liquidity. This is the case for certain derivative products that are traded in over-the-counter markets,
or structured products such as CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations). During the 2008/2009
ﬁnancial crisis, some of these assets no longer found buyers and the institutions that owned them or
sold them to state-owned funds were forced to value them according to models based on underlying
asset prices. It is the famous “mark-to-model” that enabled the savviest, such as Goldman Sachs, to
slip through the net (Sorkin, 2010).
We have just mentioned the difﬁculty in valuing non-liquid assets. The problem is signiﬁcantly
increased when it comes to insurance liabilities which are not usually traded on the market2. This
was the subject of numerous discussions during the implementation of Solvency 2. To understand
what is involved, it is important to brieﬂy review the valuation of insurance liabilities. The two main
principles are as follows:
1. The existence of liquid markets for assets and therefore of veriﬁable information on their
prices.
2. The law of one price or single price law which says that: “whatever the future state of the world,
two ﬁnancial instruments with identical cash-ﬂows will have the same market price”.
If it can be applied, this law means that the price of a ﬁnancial instrument can be easily estimated
by ﬁnding a combination of liquid instruments that together reproduce the cash-ﬂow. This is the
idea of the replicating portfolio whose origin lies in an article published by the Swiss mathematician
Euler (1767) who used this type of argument to discount life annuities. This approach
actually consists in shifting the problem of how to determine the value of an instrument without a
market, such as insurance liabilities, by looking for liquid instruments whose market prices are
easily accessible and reliable, and for which information can be obtained directly. It would work
perfectly except that insurance liabilities are subject to violent stochastic variations resulting in
considerable uncertainty as to the ﬁnal result of a policy. These variations do not have any
negotiable equivalents on ﬁnancial markets. The risks related to these cash-ﬂows therefore need to be
evaluated and a risk margin introduced that will be added to the value of the replicating portfolio.
The risk margin is deﬁned as the cost of the capital that the owner of the liabilities will need to
immobilise until natural expiry of the policy in order to offset ﬂuctuations not covered by the
replicating portfolio.
2 Certain insurance liabilities, such as natural catastrophe and pandemic risks, now have a bond market but
they only concern a very small percentage of the risks insured.
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3.2. Problems with replicating portfolios and risk margins
Figure 2 is a diagrammatic representation of the valuation process for insurance liabilities. It shows
that the problem can be divided into two parts. First, choosing the instruments that will make up the
replicating portfolio, and second, correctly evaluating the remaining risk once the choice has been
made. Only then can insurance liabilities be valued correctly. To give the reader a ﬂavour of the
problem, we highlight a discussion between the insurers and the supervisory authorities recently
concerning the ﬁrst point (choice of assets) without considering its consequences on the second point
(risk margin) (see among many consultation papers: EIOPA, 2014). The three choices examined by
the EIOPA with the insurers’ help were as follows:
1. Using the risk-free rate for replicating portfolio instruments.
2. Adding a premium to the risk-free rate for the lack of liquidity of these liabilities in favour of the
insurer who holds them.
3. Adjusting the discount rate to the assets actually owned by the insurer.
The ﬁrst solution implies that the credit risk has been eliminated from the cash-ﬂow risks to be
evaluated. The second implies that the insurer owns instruments with low liquidity, which in turn
implies an additional risk if the company has to liquidate its assets to pay for claims. Strictly
speaking, the third implies that an asset default risk should be added to the liabilities risk, which, of
course is not considered by EIOPA and the advocates of the other two solutions, because their
purpose is not to arrive at a fair price but to reduce the enhanced price of liabilities due to the low
interest rates.
We have just seen above, but also in Figure 2, that the whole object of the exercise is to ﬁnd
instruments that are liquid and whose price can be used as a negotiating tool. This is obviously not
the case for solutions 2 and 3 proposed by EIOPA and the insurance companies. Theoretically, the
Transfer the problem of valuing illiquid cash flows to a problem of 
valuation of Liquid financial instruments
Component of the cash flow that can be
replicated by deeply traded financial instruments
Non hedgeable part of the cash flow
Risk Margin
Market value of the
Replicating portfolio
Insurance Liabilities
No reliable market prices for exit
Replicating market
Reliable market prices for exit
Liability cash flow
Figure 2. Diagrammatic representation of the usual approach to economic valuation of insurance
liabilities (inspired by a slide of Philipp Keller).
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replicating portfolio does not necessarily contain only risk-free rate instruments. However, since the
risk cannot be covered by the market, it must be added to the risk premium. Generally speaking,
if the valuation is carried out strictly, the value should not change to any signiﬁcant extent. It would
simply be divided up differently. The riskier the instruments, the lower the cash -ﬂow price of the
liabilities will be, but the risk margin will be higher to take the asset risk into account. The problem
with the current discussion on replicating portfolios is that the question of re-evaluating the risk
margin has not been broached. By only considering the replicating portfolio, the value of the
liabilities is reduced because they are not valued correctly. These devices are used by the supervisory
authorities and the insurance industry to offset the low interest level and allegedly ﬁght the pro-
cyclical effect of the regulations. Yet, there are other more natural methods that would not consist in
“blaming the thermometer for the fever” so to speak. We proposed one such method in Besson et al.
(2010) which would simply consist in being more ﬂexible about the threshold at which the capital is
measured (VaR) during a serious ﬁnancial crisis.
3.3. Risk margin, cost of capital and capital allocation
Certainly, economic valuation comprises unresolved problems, the ﬁrst being the one we have just
discussed, that is, the deﬁnition of assets in the replicating portfolio, while the second is related to the
deﬁnition of risk margin. The risk margin is deﬁned as the cost of capital that must be held until
extinction of the contract’s cash-ﬂows. Here again, two ingredients must be deﬁned: the unit cost of
capital, which is arbitrarily ﬁxed at 6% by Solvency 2 and the SST, and the capital needed at each
stage of payment. This second ingredient also raises controversy. For a study and in-depth discussion
of the deﬁnition and calculation of capital costs, please refer to Auerbach’s (1983) original article,
which lays the foundations of the problem and underlines both the difﬁculties and the limits
involved. In principle, the capital required to guarantee payment not only depends on the underlying
risk but also on the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation offered by the insurer’s portfolio. The same contract
would have a different value depending on which portfolio it belongs to. This would be a problem
for accountants who would want to apply the same sort of valuation to the company’s liabilities –
this would contradict the accounting principle of making sure that balance sheets can be compared.
The same contradiction can also be found in the Solvency 2 regulations which require that com-
panies calculate the risk margins for each legal entity and do not allow reinsurers the diversiﬁcation
beneﬁt of their portfolio as a whole, for example. This difference can be very signiﬁcant in the case of
reinsurance. For SCOR, for example, it means hundreds of millions of Euros (Dacorogna et al.,
2011) to be deducted from the available capital.
Another problem, which is rarely broached and remains unsolved, is the allocation of capital to the
different stages of cash-ﬂow payment. Non-life actuaries are usually capable of correctly estimating
the capital needed to cover the contract up to ultimate, but the breakdown of capital over the course
of time is not easy. In absence of a general method, it is often calculated approximately using a
simple formula. If Monte Carlo methods are used to estimate the ultimate risk, the remaining capital
should theoretically be estimated at each stage of payment. This would mean simulation calculations
within the simulation, which is obviously not tractable for payments that frequently extend over
several years. Rough approximations are therefore generally used to calculate the breakdown of
capital over the course of time and estimate the risk margin without having to carry out complicated
calculations. Progress should be made in this respect in the next few years. By deﬁning classes of
stochastic processes to develop cash-ﬂows, it should be possible to stick closer to reality and avoid
some of the difﬁculties involved in the economic valuation of insurance liabilities (see Dacorogna
et al. (2015) for an example of a ﬁrst step in this direction).
Michel Dacorogna
220
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1748499518000040
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich, on 27 Mar 2019 at 12:52:51, subject to the Cambridge Core
Despite all these obstacles, the economic valuation approach remains central to the new paradigm
which has been established in the insurance industry and is not going to disappear soon. Opposition
is currently focussed on the weaknesses of the method while ignoring the progress it represents in a
more realistic valuation of insurance business, and business in general, because it includes the notions
of time, risk and market as vehicles of information.
4. The Internal Model to Assess the Capital
We will now consider one of the core components of this change in perspective caused by the quantitative
assessment of insurance risks, namely risk modelling. Today, European regulations, whether Solvency 2
or SST, encourage companies to develop their own models to estimate their risks, or offer them the
alternative of using the standard EIOPA formula or standard Finma model. Whatever their choice,
companies will need to perform a quantitative assessment of their risks. Some, like reinsurers, who are
often avant-garde in this respect, have not waited for the new regulations to perform quantitative
modelling of their business portfolio. Swiss Re, for example, has been developing an in-house model since
1993 (James et al., 2013), while SCOR has had its own model since 2003 (Dacorogna, 2009).
Notwithstanding the risk-based solvency, the quantitative estimation of the company’s risks is playing
an increasingly central role. We have seen that it enters more and more into the organisation’s
decision process. It increases the perception of risk in the company as a whole. At the same time,
it guides strategic choices and facilitates meaningful discussions on major issues. It does not mean
blindly following the results given by models, but any decision to depart from the model’s outcomes
must be based on solid arguments. This is why insurers are using them more and more and we are
witnessing the move towards increasingly industrialised systems that are becoming an integral part of
companies.
Quantifying risk is today becoming core to many organisations. It is part of the way management
learned to reduce uncertainty to cope strategically with risks (see for a good introduction to this
question: Friberg, 2015). The in-house model is used to quantify most of the risks to which the
company is exposed: underwriting risks (P&C and life), market risks, credit risks and operational
risks. Some risks like reputation risk or strategic risks are difﬁcult to quantify and are usually not
part of internal models. Some others, like liquidity risks are often neglected but could be included in
some models through special treatment of the fat tails of the probability distributions.
The risk of the company’s economic balance sheet is estimated by modelling the variable, X(t),
deﬁned in equation (4) at a 1-year horizon. This variable is considered to be a stochastic variable
(as explained in section 2.2, usually modelled by means of Monte Carlo simulations based on
knowledge of the probability distributions of underlying risks and their dependencies. Since it is
a 1-year projection, the in-house models include economic planning data in addition to accounting
and actuarial data. The integration of the company’s various data is one of the collateral beneﬁts of
these models. They provide an overview of all the processes involved: economic planning, accounting
and actuarial.
4.1. The four generations of risk models
Over the years, these instruments have become increasingly sophisticated and complex, but their
development is a natural part of the evolution of modelling in insurance which is no doubt one of the
ﬁrst industries to systematically quantify its risks in order to establish a viable business model.
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We have already mentioned Euler’s article written in 1767, which proposes a way to calculate life
annuities. The widespread use of mortality tables goes back to the 1860s. Actuarial calculations in
P&C insurance did not appear until later, at the beginning of the 20th century. Modelling thus began
by taking an interest in the risks themselves. In a natural evolution, the actuaries studied the
aggregation of these risks in a portfolio. It was an Italian actuary, de Finetti, who ﬁrst developed the
portfolio optimisation theorem in the 1940s (de Finetti, 1940). The theorem was to make Markowitz’s
fortune in the 1950s and 1960s when he applied it to the ﬁeld of ﬁnancial investments in conjunction
with his idea of an efﬁcient frontier (Markowitz, 1952). It is interesting that Markowitz himself caveats
his theory in the ﬁrst and the last paragraphs of his paper, emphasising its reliance that we already have
beliefs about the future performances of available securities. Nevertheless, actuaries forgot this caveat
and went ahead trying to estimate risk aggregations, to high percentiles. Still today, the question of
dependence between risks remains a central question of risk modelling.
This ﬁrst generation of models, whose main aim was to calculate policy premiums, gradually led to
the emergence of models integrating all the risks involved to evaluate the capital needed to conduct
the company’s business. The evolution occurred at the same time as that of banks and the ﬁrst efforts
of the Basle committee to instigate risk-based banking regulations. The beginning of the 21st century
was marked by dynamic ﬁnancial analysis models (Blum & Dacorogna, 2004) aimed at determining
the company’s risk by modelling the balance sheet and estimating the risk measure (VaR or TVaR)
related to a change in the company’s accounting value.
Figure 3 shows the above evolution by depicting four generations of models. Today, insurers have
more ambitious aims for the fourth generation of models. They want them to help generate more
value in their business by optimising the asset–liability portfolio, examining the beneﬁts of diversi-
ﬁcation of the different types of business, optimising reinsurance coverage to reduce the cost of
capital and planning the development of the company’s business more quantitatively. All these
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applications go much further than simply assessing the solvency requirements. They require
knowledge of the entire probability distribution of any changes in the company’s economic value.
We have illustrated this by indicating distribution as the end product of the fourth generation of
models in Figure 3. It must therefore be possible to use these models to answer the question of What
is the probability of achieving the set target? And not just “What is the risk at a frequency of once
every 200 years”! It is paradoxical that the extremes were considered ﬁrst in the third generation of
models, even though by deﬁnition the data required to estimate their value are insufﬁcient, while the
centre of the distribution where the data are by deﬁnition more abundant, was neglected and has
been reintroduced in the fourth generation. The most modern insurers therefore use the entire range
of data available, which has been reinforced by the abundance of data provided by the Internet
of Things3 and the possibilities it offers for deﬁning coverage more accurately to optimise the
calculation of premiums and the risk models.
With the implementation of the new regulations, the process for producing the model, in addition
to providing data access, is playing an increasingly important role within the organisation. Both the
pertinence of the data used and the results produced by the model must be guaranteed. As in the case of
balance sheets, much stricter control processes are gradually being implemented. In particular, according
to the new regulations, the model must be validated by an independent body. Companies either use
external consultants or develop independent capacities internally, alongside the modelling department.
A future possibility would be to have the results audited by specialised ﬁrms. This is not yet the case, but
consultants are appearing on the market who would like to play this role. However, the production of
internal models must not be institutionalised to the detriment of the ﬂexibility needed to adapt the
methodologies to developments in science and programming techniques. This is one of the dangers facing
insurance companies, and modellers and actuaries must play their role to avoid it. Risk evaluation
requires know-how and qualiﬁcations that go far beyond those needed for accounting. Nor will the
results of the internal model ever have the precision and accuracy of a corporate balance sheet. The
model is concerned with statistical estimations and not the calculation and classiﬁcation of cash-ﬂows.
Assuming that the model is perfectly adequate, these estimations will only ever be accurate to within a
few per cent, which represents several tens and even several hundreds of millions of euros. This situation
is difﬁcult to accept for managers who are used to the precision of accounting ﬁgures. The supervisory
authorities are in the same situation and regard with suspicion any variations in ﬁgures concerning the
internal model. Yet these are inevitable.
4.2. Internal models and diversification
One of the important by-products of the model is the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt, in other words,
the amount of capital saved by aggregating the risks on the portfolio. The diversiﬁcation beneﬁt
is calculated as follows (Bürgi et al., 2008):
Dn = 1
ρ
Pn
i=1 Yi
 
Pn
i=1 ρ Yið Þ
(8)
where the random variable, Yi, represents a particular portfolio risk and ρ represents, as in
equation (3), the risk measure chosen (VaR or TVaR). It should be noted in passing that, although it
is of considerable interest, this quantity is not universally deﬁned and depends on the number
3 An insurance company such as AXAWinterthur in Switzerland has enough conﬁdence to offer discounts on
its vehicle insurance policies if customers agree to put a “black box” in their vehicle to record their driving
parameters. It thus collects a substantial amount of data.
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of risks, n, considered in the calculation. This is why we have deﬁned it with an index, n, in
equation (8). Papachristou did an interesting review and discussion of this problem in an IFoA
document (Papachristou, 2015).
In Table 2, we give an example of the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt as reported by SCOR during its Investor
Day in July 2009 (SCOR, 2009). Even if they are a little dated, these ﬁgures are a good illustration of
the advantage to be gained by examining the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt obtained by a company when the
calculation of its capital is based on all the risks involved. It can be seen, for example, that in
the case of a reinsurer, investments only represent a small portion of the risk in comparison with the
portfolio, although their individual capital corresponds to more than half the individual capital of
the company’s life insurance business. In the end run, when its main business lines are considered, the
company achieves a diversiﬁcation beneﬁt of 47%, which is considerable. The ﬁgures published
by other reinsurers are similar (see, for instance, the investor’s presentations of Munich Re
(2017) for 2016 was 36%). The diversiﬁcation beneﬁt is essential for this type of business to operate
smoothly (Boller & Dacorogna, 2004). Reinsurers therefore take particular care when modelling the
dependences in their portfolios. For instance, SCOR actuaries have developed a sophisticated
Bayesian technique to elicit expert opinions to make up for the lack of data in the tails of the
distribution in order to calibrate non-linear dependences, PrObEx (Arbenz & Canestraro, 2012).
This point illustrates, some aspects of the new role of actuaries, who are no longer conﬁned
to the evaluation of reserves and the computation of premiums but also in addressing the strategic
issues of modelling risk like risk aggregation and how to solicit experts for helping calibrating the
models.
4.3. The various forms of internal models
To complete this brief incursion into the world of internal models, we would like to mention that
at least three types of quantitative models exist for insurance risks:
1. Stochastic-type models based on probability distributions and more or less sophisticated
modelling of risk interdependence. Generally speaking, the internal models of companies belong
to this category.
2. Deterministic-type models, or factor models: the capital is calculated by multiplying the volume
of business by a speciﬁc factor (often called the capital intensity). These models are typically used
by rating agencies to estimate the capital requirements of the companies they are rating.
Table 2. Internal model results for SCOR as published in 2009 in million EUR (SCOR, 2009).
Group RC (net of
reisurance and hedging)
Risk capital
stand-alone
Diversiﬁed
risk capital
Total portion of the
group RC (%)
Diversiﬁcation
beneﬁt (%)
P&C new business 1,200 820 24 32
P&C reserves 1,600 1,240 36 23
Life business 1,800 900 26 50
Investments 970 240 4 87
Counterparty and credit risk 280 40 1 86
Foreign exchange and other balance sheet items 330 60 2 82
Operational risk 240 240 6 0
Total 6,720 3,400 100 47
Note: RC, risk capital.
Michel Dacorogna
224
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1748499518000040
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich, on 27 Mar 2019 at 12:52:51, subject to the Cambridge Core
3. Scenario-based models: several scenarios are applied to the economic balance sheet to examine
the value of the company in relation to different states of the world. These models, also called
stress tests, were applied by the Fed to American banks in March 2009. The positive results
restored market conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial system.
Most companies use a combination of these approaches. While deterministic models are preferred
because they are simple to use and give almost instantaneous answers to the questions posed, they
are not very ﬂexible. Factors that have been determined in certain situations may be less relevant in
other circumstances or if there is a substantial change in the insurer’s portfolio. The other two types
have connections. Stochastic models are used to explore a large number of scenarios with con-
siderable efﬁciency. However, the scenarios they generate are rarely identiﬁed or comprehensible to
their users. Scenarios applied to the economic balance sheet are more intuitive because they are based
either on historical values or strategic visions of a possible state of the world in the future. In practice,
the latter are often used to verify the plausibility of the results obtained with stochastic models. That
is how they are used by Finma which asks its insurers to provide the results of six scenarios in
addition to those of the internal model. For more details on the subject of internal models and their
developments, the reader should refer to the article (Dacorogna, 2009).
5. ERM
We will complete this overview of the fundamental changes in the insurance world due to
the implementation of new solvency rules with the still very topical question of enterprise risk
management, often designated by its acronym, ERM. For many years, risk management was con-
sidered to be the speciﬁc duty of the Chief Risk Ofﬁcers (CRO) and their small teams. They were
responsible to ensure that the organisation was not too exposed and that the designated limits were
respected. With everyone working in silos, the speciﬁc role of the CRO was to make sure that the
sum of the parts did not exceed the capacity of the whole. Most of the time, they reported
organisationally to the Chief Financial Ofﬁcer (CFO). This is still the case in many companies.
However, new awareness that risk is the very object of insurance has completely changed the
perspective. Managing risks means managing insurance business in the long term. It is thus one of the
direct tasks of both the Chief Executive Ofﬁcer (CEO) and the Chief Underwriting Ofﬁcer (CUO).
In the most progressive companies, the CRO is directly accountable to the CEO. In the board of
directors’ organisation, alongside the strategic, audit and remuneration committees, there is now a
risk committee to which the CEO and the CRO must report. These organisational changes are a
reﬂection of the new awareness that risk management is essential to sustainable and proﬁtable
business. Also, actuaries now play an essential role in risk management as they allow the intro-
duction of quantitative risk management in the practice of risk managers. We often ﬁnd actuaries as
CRO of companies as currently at SCOR, Aviva, NN Group or Partner Re.
ERM is based on the recognition that there is a risk associated with each expected return and that
risk and return need to be proportionate. The higher the risk, the greater the expected return must be
and vice versa. Since the company’s capital is limited, it must be used in such a way that it will
generate maximum proﬁt while guaranteeing the company’s ﬁnancial stability. A point of equili-
brium must be found between solvency, proﬁtability and business development where none of the
three is favoured at the expense of the two others. Managing risk thus also means managing the
company’s performance. The CRO is no longer seen as a spoilsport but as a business facilitator,
the person who encourages ongoing development that is commensurate with the company’s
capacities and market characteristics. What a change of perspective!
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5.1. Risk culture as a basis of ERM
ERM therefore implies the fostering and the wide-spreading of a strong risk culture throughout the
organisation. It concerns everyone in the company. Management must make sure that each employee
is conscious of his/her role and be familiar with the in force risk management rules. These rules have
the following aim:
∙ A clear deﬁnition of the types of risks that the company wants to have in its portfolio, that is, its
risk appetite.
∙ The precise delimitation of its risk tolerance, which can be deduced from the requirements of the
various stakeholders (shareholders, customers/regulators, rating agencies and corporate management).
∙ A clear vision of the risk proﬁle deduced from the two aims set out above.
∙ The establishment of precise limits for each individual risk as deduced from the three elements
above, namely risk appetite, risk tolerance and risk proﬁle.
In order to establish this type of culture, the different components must be explained in a series of
guidelines available not only to each person in the company but also to all the stakeholders con-
cerned. They are the ground rules, so to speak, established by the company and promoted both inside
and outside the organisation.
An efﬁcient and deeply rooted governance structure is obviously required. We saw earlier that changes
are taking place that will make risk management a company’s core consideration. The role of the Board
of Directors, as the shareholders’ representative, will be to guarantee that a clear risk appetite and
associated proﬁle are established. It is the board that determines the risk tolerance, in conjunction with
the General Management, and ensures that this information is understood properly throughout the
entire organisation. This not only means greater transparency in hierarchical relations in this respect,
but also regular feedback from the lower ranks to the management and board of directors in order to
verify that the rules are lived through and that the risk strategy can be and is followed.
To explain this approach more clearly, we are going to illustrate it with a concrete example drawn
from our own practice. Establishing an investment strategy in insurance is a complex process that
involves several sectors of the organisation. The board of directors and the executive committee
deﬁne the limits not to be exceeded in terms of capital. For example, they decide that investments
must not account for more than 20% of the RAC allocated to the company’s risk. Once the limit has
been determined, the executive committee decides what effective portion of the RAC is to be allo-
cated to investments, for instance, 10%, in order to be sure not to overrun the set limit of 20%. The
investment committee must then determine the effective capital allocation to the different asset
categories according to the assets/liabilities management strategy used to determine both the dura-
tion of the bond portfolio to hedge reserve ﬂuctuations due to interest rates and the proportion of the
different types of risky assets that will optimise the performance of the investment portfolio without
exceeding the allocated limits. On this basis, the managers, who are responsible for carrying out the
transactions on the market, will receive a risk budget that they then have to optimise. It can be seen
in this example that the ERM approach concerns every level of the company and that commu-
nication in both directions is essential to the execution and effective control of the strategy.
5.2. The three pillars of ERM
This necessary transparency is illustrated in Figure 4 showing the different responsibilities required
for good risk management and the correction of faulty operational processes (in red). It can be seen
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that the risk culture must be widespread within the organisation and have feedback systems at every
level. This is the basis on which ERM can be built according to the following three pillars:
1. Quantitative assessment of the risks based on a model of the company’s portfolio.
2. Monitoring and management of emerging risks.
3. Development of risk control and signalling processes.
The ﬁrst pillar was discussed at length in the previous section. The second pillar is an essential
component of risk management to prevent the company being taken by surprise by the emergence of
a devastating risk. An example of such unexpected developments hitting badly the insurance
industry is the discovery of asbestos causing lung cancer. Another one is the change of the French
legislation concerning the reimbursement of automobile accidents which went from a system of
awarding a lump sum for damages to the payment of annuities. The British market is currently
experiencing an unexpectedly enormous drop in the discount rates being used for lump sum court
awards, which also modiﬁes the reserving of liabilities. Continual monitoring must be organised
within the different departments to identify and evaluate potential risks and propose ways of hedging
their consequences. For the ﬁrst mission, both internal sources and all affordable external sources
will be used. An example of using external resources is that of a company in the United States that
digitalises all the scientiﬁc articles published each year in chemistry and biology (more than 50,000!)
to determine the number of times certain substances are mentioned, which is seen as an indication
that side effects of the substances are being discovered. The consequences of such risks are evaluated
by involving all the parties concerned in the organisation, including the ﬁnance department to
examine the ﬁnancial impact and study hedging possibilities in ﬁnancial markets. Various measures
can be taken if a risk is identiﬁed: the search for a hedging strategy with reinsurers or on ﬁnancial
markets, imposing new limits on underwriting, changing insurance contracts and, as a last resort,
securing access to liquidity through contingent capital contracts, for example. To conclude this brief
reminder of the measures to be taken to prepare for emerging risks, let us point out that it is
important to draw lessons from those which have already appeared by setting up speciﬁc procedures
to manage them.
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Figure 4. Diagrammatic representation of risk management transparency policy. ERM, enterprise
risk management.
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The third pillar of ERM is, of course, the control and information processes which must be present
at every level. Without efﬁcient control and information systems, it would not be possible to verify
that limits are respected, that compliance is properly enforced, that processes are well functioning.
This means identifying, prioritising and controlling any possible sources of risk. We have already
spoken of the importance of precise, written guidelines which must be communicated and
understood throughout the organisation. In addition, these rules must also include clear procedures
concerning the risks incurred if they are not respected. None of the above would make sense without
the existence of regular processes to measure the exposures and compare them against the limits.
Here, the internal model is a precious tool because it pools all the portfolio data available, but it is
not enough. Tools to control accumulated exposure to risk are indispensable complements. All the
major reinsurance companies, for example, have developed IT platforms to monitor their exposure
to natural catastrophes. They are used to compare the business volume to the limits deﬁned and
produce reports that will be used in the CROs quarterly risk dashboard presented to the company’s
risk committee and board of directors. The risk dashboard, which is a short document consisting of
several pages of text and signs with a colour code designed to rapidly visualise possible problems of
risk management, is an indispensable communication tool at top management level. The aim is to
regularly produce a rapidly accessible risk inventory. The effort required to produce this summary
report involves reﬂection on crucial points by all the company’s different structures.
The European regulations, with Solvency 2 and SST, and, the American regulations, with the NAIC
ORSA Guidance, have highlighted the usefulness of ORSA (Own Risk and Solvency Assessment) for the
company’s management and Board – and its importance to regulators. A distinction should be made
between the ORSA process and the ORSA report. The ORSA process is indistinguishable from ERM
and is intended to ensure that all the ERM activities are appropriate to the company’s speciﬁc risk
proﬁle, prospective and appropriately taken into account in the company’s decision-making. The ORSA
report is intended to summarise the key outputs and conclusions of the ORSA process in a clear and
digestible format for the management, the Board and the regulator.
ORSA is becoming an increasingly important component of the corporate reporting system and ﬁts
in perfectly with the third pillar of ERM. (For more information about ORSA see the Milliman
reports (Bradley et al., 2015) on the ORSA implementation worldwide and speciﬁcally on Solvency II
(Clarke & Phelan, 2015).)
5.3. The goal of ERM: strategic risk management
The risk culture and the three pillars are the foundations of strategic risk management. As we have
already pointed out, this type of management focusses on balancing risk and performance and is
aimed at optimising the portfolio accordingly. An example of this type of management can be seen in
Figure 5.
The portfolio’s efﬁcient frontier4 is shown as a function of the risk measure considered (here, TVaR)
and the breakdown of the company’s asset portfolio. The aim is to determine the strategic allocation
of assets. The frontier is based on modelling the portfolio as a whole (assets and liabilities) where the
proportion of the investment in shares is made to vary from 0% to 25%. It can be seen that a
portfolio that only contains bonds (ﬁrst point on the curve on the left) would not be on the frontier.
4 Here, the feasible set of all strategies is actually the same as the efﬁcient frontier, while in Markowitz the
feasible set is a two-dimensional set below the efﬁcient frontier.
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A minimum risk can be expected with a portfolio containing 5% shares. This will therefore be the
lower limit of strategic allocation. The upper limit is determined by the maximum authorised risk
capital which, here, is about 16%. The optimum point will be obtained at the point of contact
between the tangent, whose slope will be equal to the company’s proﬁt target, and the efﬁcient
frontier curve, here 12%. The strategic share allocation will therefore be between 5% and 16% with
an optimum allocation around 12%. The investment committee will then have the task of ﬁxing its
tactical allocation within these margins depending on the strategic indications provided. The
importance of good risk quantiﬁcation can be seen here as well as the usefulness of the internal
model combined with a clear process for deﬁning the strategic allocation. This is a far cry from the
discussions held by management bodies in the past on portfolio share allocation. The capital and
how it is used is now the main focus and enables the different business proposals to be assessed
accordingly. The very aim of ERM is to make the most of the capital at the company’s disposal in
order to achieve the company’s performance objectives.
It can therefore be seen that ERM is a necessary development of insurance practice. It affects the
entire organisation, it highlights the value drivers of insurance (risk/return in a portfolio perspective),
and it allows to measure the performance of the business and helps to make the company more
transparent for all stakeholders. It is not a passing fad that the companies are forced to accept. ERM
is simply a more professional way of approaching business when risks are becoming more complex
and more extreme. In this case, understanding the risks and the dependence between them is essential
to cope with this new reality. It will therefore be the backbone of insurance in the future. It requires
long-term commitment on the part of all the company’s structures in order to achieve excellence.
In the words of Aristotle: “We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, therefore, is not an act but a
habit”. This maxim expresses a wisdom that fully applies to ERM.
6. Conclusion
We have come to the end of this review of the changes experienced by insurance companies with the
ascent of risk-based solvency. The arrival of the Solvency 2 directive in Europe spurred on a process
that had already started well beforehand, under the pressure of ﬁnancial markets and liberalisation
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Figure 5. Efﬁcient frontier of assets–liabilities portfolio as a function of the share breakdown of
investments.
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of the capital and insurance markets. Social protection and security requirements encourage insur-
ance companies to think about the best ways of offering consumers high-quality services at the
lowest price. They have to adapt their practices accordingly. The 2008/2009 ﬁnancial crisis showed
the importance of relating performance to risk. Financial institutions putting target ROE at 25%,
while interest rates were constantly going down, were bound to take too much risk to achieve such
targets (see the critical view on this from: Wolf, 2011). The resilience of insurance companies during
this period is also evidence of more consistent risk management on the part of institutions that have
always been faced with extreme risks.
In insurance, we are moving from cash-ﬂow management to risk and capital management. This implies
long-term commitment and, as we have seen, a fundamental reorganisation of the company’s structures.
The quantitative approach is becoming increasingly important. Actuaries are coming out of the wings
onto the stage. They are now in the front line and must answer the company’s basic strategic questions.
Internal models and complex IT systems to process large amounts of data are becoming core activities.
Following the example of banks, the industrialisation of quantitative activities is on the agenda
everywhere. In addition to the production of ordinary balance sheets, economic balance sheets and
risk assessments will now be regularly produced and published with ORSA and the third pillar of
Solvency 2. This practice should encourage transparency and market discipline.
In this paper, we have reviewed some of the major changes such as the introduction of new capital
management, the development of internal models and the spreading of ERM within organisations as well
as the changes they imply in terms of the roles of various actors and the limitations to be overcome. Such a
radical change of paradigm does not come without questions and problems. There are numerous limits and
controversies concerning the application of these new standards. We have mentioned some of them along
these pages. Many are related to the application of economic valuation to insurance contracts. Economic
valuation was initially designed for short-term ﬁnancial instruments. The methodology must be adapted to
the speciﬁc conditions of insurance contracts which, by deﬁnition, are long-term commitments, particularly
in life insurance. What risks should be attributed to time? And, as a result, how much capital should be
allocated? This question remains largely unexplored and should ﬁnd a satisfactory theoretical answer in the
future. It should be an important goal for academics working on actuarial mathematics to explore this
question. Coming up with a good method should solve many of the problems still posed today. However,
since the advantages of economic valuation largely outweigh its drawbacks, it is clear that this approach
will override the others and there will be no going back. ERM will soon be part of insurers’ DNA. The
path is long and thorny but there is no question about the direction in which it is going.
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